Stability and Auctions in Labor Markets with Job Security
By Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky
Economics Letters, 154, pp. 55-58, 2017.
Job Security, Stability and Production Efficiency
By Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky
Theoretical Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, pages 1 – 24, 2017
Presentation
(older version from EC’12 is here, and here are slides for that older version)
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
By Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan
Journal of Economic Theory, 156, pages 45-76, 2015
Efficiency Levels in Sequential Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals
By Ron Lavi and Ella Segev
International Journal of Game Theory 43(4): 791-819, 2014.
PowerPoint Presentation
(abstract of this paper plus new results with O. Compte in EC’12. See the full version here)
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
By Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren
Games and Economic Behavior, 76(2): 439-456, 2012.
PowerPoint Presentation
An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling
By Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, and Ron Lavi
Mathematics of Operations Research , 37(2): 244-258, 2012.
PowerPoint Presentation
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
By Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, and Noam Nisan
Games and Economic Behavior, 74, pp. 486–503, 2012.
A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in Quasi-linear Settings with Public Budgets
By Ron Lavi and Marina May
Economics Letters 115, pp. 100-103, 2012
PowerPoint Presentation
Truthful and Near-optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
By Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy
Journal of the ACM, 58(6), 2011
PowerPoint Presentation
Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
By Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi, and Moshe Tennenholtz
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 10(1), Article 20, 2010
PowerPoint Presentation
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity
By Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy
Games and Economic Behavior, 67(1), pp. 99 — 124, 2009.
PowerPoint Presentation
Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts’ Theorem
By Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem, and Noam Nisan
Social Choice and Welfare, 32, pp. 407 — 423, 2009.
A clarification to the proof of Claim 6, kindly suggested by Alexey Kushnir and Shuo Liu.
Single Value Combinatorial Auctions and Implementation in Undominated Strategies
By Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov
Journal of the ACM, 56(1), pp. 4:1 — 4:32, 2009.
PowerPoint Presentation
Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation
By S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu’alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen
Econometrica, 74(4), pp. 1109 — 1132, 2006.
See also the supplementary material for this paper.
Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions
By Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan
Theoretical Computer Science 310(1), pp. 159-180, 2004.
PowerPoint Presentation